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Abstract 
This article discusses the interplay between nationalism and populism in the Flemish 
(North-Belgian), Vlaams Bloc/Vlaams Belang’s (VB), populist radical right rhetoric about 
expressive culture. Building on a discourse theoretical analysis of three extensive case 
studies (concerts against the VB, the opposition between the VB and the Flemish theatres, 
and the VB’s criticism of the Flemish National Songfest), and a number of other 
controversial moments the article shows that nationalist and populist discourse play 
different roles in VB rhetoric about expressive culture. Radical and exclusionary 
nationalism is the ideological core of the VB’s views on culture and of its relationships 
with artists. Populism is a strategy the party uses to position itself as the political 
representative of the people, to present its nationalist demands as the will of the people, 
and to dismiss opposition to the party and its radical and exclusionary nationalist 
ideology as elitist. 
The VB’s ‘positive’ populist strategy of associating with popular Flemish artists and genres, 
the article shows, has only had limited success. By contrast, the party’s ‘negative’ populist 
strategy of criticising artists as an elite has been instrumental in delegitimising the strong, 
mainly anti-racist, resistance from the part of artists against the VB. It has reduced artistic 
resistance to the VB and its ideology to support of the political elite. And it has presented 
artists themselves as an elite that is completely out of touch with the ordinary people 
who suffer from multicultural society. The VB’s nationalist-populist rhetoric about 
expressive culture has thus contributed to the construction of the antagonism that is 
central to its populist radical right politics: the antagonism between on the one hand the 
anti-Flemish and multiculturalist political, cultural, media, and intellectual elite and on the 
other hand the people and the radical and exclusionary Flemish nationalist VB as the 
party of the people. 
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Introduction 
The radical right has been a major 
political player in Belgian politics for 
almost three decades now. Flanders, the 
Northern, Dutch-speaking part of 
Belgium, was confronted with the 
electoral breakthrough of the radical 
right party VB1 in the late 1980s, and saw 
the party enjoy continuous electoral 
gains until the mid 2000s.2 Expressive 
culture has been one of the arenas in 
which the discursive struggle between 
the VB and its opponents has been 
fought out, with recurring controversies 
about cultural policy and artistic 
freedom, and with artists and media 
celebrities taking a stand against and, 
very occasionally, in favour of the VB. 
Artists have been among the most vocal 
critics of the VB and its ideology. Belgium 
has seen concerts against the VB; songs 
denouncing racism and defending 
ethnic-cultural diversity; theatre plays 
reflecting on Flemish radical right 
collaboration with Nazi Germany; and 
artists and media celebrities speaking 
out against the VB on numerous 
occasions. The VB, for its part, has 
vehemently criticised artists – especially 
those artists that spoke out against the 
VB or were explicitly critical of its radical 
and exclusionary nationalism. Party 
militants disrupted Willem Vermandere’s 
performance of his ‘Bange blanke man’ 
(Scared white man), at the 1992 Flemish 
national holiday celebrations; the party 
1 Vlaams Blok (Flemish Bloc), renamed Vlaams 
Belang (Flemish Interest), in 2004 after a 
conviction for racism. 
2 In the mid 2000s, an electoral downfall set in 
that reduced the party to around 5 per cent of 
the vote in the 2014 regional, federal and 
European election. This demise had various 
causes, but the main cause was the ascendancy 
of another, more moderate right-wing and 
Flemish nationalist party. 
continuously denounced the Flemish 
theatres for their multiculturalist, anti-
Flemish and elitist programme; and 
‘reminded’ popular artists performing at 
pro-tolerance and pro-Belgian concerts 
in open letters that many of their fans 
were VB voters and would not appreciate 
being told off. The VB has also attempted 
to forge ties with artists and had some 
successes, but largely failed. All things 
considered, the VB’s relation to artists 
has been markedly negative and 
antagonistic. 
Academic analyses of the VB have paid 
very little attention to culture in the 
sense of expressive culture, ‘the works 
and practices of intellectual and 
especially artistic activity’ (Williams 1983: 
90), (I will henceforth simply speak of 
culture to refer to expressive culture). 
There are some references to the VB’s 
views on cultural policy and to the 
party’s relation with artists in 
investigative journalistic or semi-
academic works about the VB (e.g. Gijsels 
1992; Spruyt 1995, 2000, 2006), and in 
broader analyses of cultural policy in 
Flanders (De Pauw 2007). Next to this, 
artists and cultural critics have reflected 
on the VB, and on the role of art in 
resisting radical right politics. But little 
has been said about for example the 
VB’s use of music, at its party meetings 
or the party’s (complex), connections to 
radical right subcultures, nor have there 
been true systematic analyses of VB 
rhetoric about culture.  
This article focuses on a crucial 
dimension of VB rhetoric about culture: 
the use of a populist strategy to 
legitimise its radical and exclusionary 
nationalist demands as representing the 
will of the ordinary people, and to 
simultaneously discredit as elitist artistic 
criticism of the VB and cultural 
productions that deviate from the VB’s 
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nationalist ideas. The article builds on a 
discourse theoretical analysis of three 
extensive case studies (concerts against 
the VB, the opposition between the VB 
and the Flemish theatres, and the VB’s 
criticism of the Flemish National 
Songfest), and a number of other 
controversial moments to show how 
nationalism and populism have been 
combined in VB rhetoric about culture. 
After brief sections on the basic 
assumptions of discourse theory and the 
principles of discourse theoretical 
analysis, the next two sections define 
populism and nationalism as distinctive 
discourses. Using this distinction 
between populism and nationalism, the 
following sections then go on to discuss 
the VB’s nationalist views on culture and 
its connections to Flemish nationalist 
(sub)cultural strategies, and the different 
ways in which the party has combined 
its nationalist ideological core with a 
populist strategy in the context of 
culture. 
 
 
Discourse theoretical analysis as the study 
of articulation 
 
The current discourse theoretical 
analysis (Carpentier and De Cleen 2007), 
of how VB rhetoric about artists and 
culture combines populism and 
nationalism hinges on the notion of 
articulation. Articulation takes up a 
central position in the poststructuralist 
and post-Marxist discourse theory 
formulated by Laclau and Mouffe 
(2001/1985), and further developed by 
the so-called Essex school (see Glynos 
and Howarth 2007). Discourse theory 
sees politics as a discursive struggle for 
hegemony, whereby hegemony is seen 
as the (always partial and temporary), 
fixation of meaning (Torfing 1999: 36-38). 
In studying political projects’ attempts to 
fix meaning, discourse theory studies 
how political practices produce a 
structure of meaning through the 
articulation of discursive elements 
(Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 3). 
 
In discourse theory, with its focus on 
how meaning comes about through 
meaning relations, articulation refers to 
bringing together discursive elements in 
a particular way to construct a more or 
less original structure of meaning. Any 
discourse builds on (elements of), 
existing discourses. In this fashion, 
political projects are always connected 
to political history and to the broader 
political context within which they 
operate. Each politics is necessarily tied 
in to the existing and more 
encompassing structures of meaning it 
draws on, reproduces, alters, and 
contests. The agency of political actors 
lies in the fact that articulations are 
contingent relations of ‘no necessary 
correspondence’ (Laclau 1990: 35), – 
which discursive elements are combined 
is a matter of political strategy and 
choice. Moreover, the process of 
articulation changes the meaning of the 
elements it articulates (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001: 105, 113-114). For 
example, the notion of ‘national pride’ 
acquires a very different meaning when 
articulated in the rhetoric of a left-wing 
rhetoric opposed to supranational 
economic policies than when articulated 
in a radical right-wing rhetoric opposed 
to immigration.  
 
It is useful to introduce an analytical 
distinction between the terms rhetoric 
and discourse here, in order to avoid the 
common confusion that comes with 
using the term discourse on different 
levels of abstraction. I will use the terms 
rhetoric and discourse, respectively, for 
the discursive practices under study and 
the more encompassing and more 
stable structures of meaning those 
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discursive practices draw on, contest, 
and reproduce (see Jørgensen and 
Phillips 2002: 140). This article studies 
how VB rhetoric about artists and culture 
articulates populist and nationalist 
discourses. In line with discourse 
theoretical analysis’ more macro 
approach to the study of discourse 
compared to other discourse studies 
approaches (Carpentier and De Cleen 
2007), it takes into account the 
discursive dimension of a wide range of 
VB practices related to culture. This 
includes written and spoken language 
but also cultural performances. To 
empirically identify the central elements 
of VB rhetoric about culture and study 
their articulations, the discourse-
theoretical framework is combined with 
critical discourse analytical strategies 
(Fairclough 2003; Wodak et al. 2009), and 
with the procedures of qualitative 
content analysis (Coffey and Atkinson 
1996; Wester 1995). 
 
 
Nationalism as a discourse 
 
In order to analyse how the VB 
articulates populism and nationalism in 
its rhetoric about culture and in its 
relations with artists, let me start by 
theoretically disentangling nationalism 
and populism as distinctive discourses 
(see De Cleen 2016 for a more extensive 
discussion).3 Because the theoretical 
overlap between populism and 
nationalism is chiefly found in definitions 
of populism, I first define nationalism and 
then move on to define populism in a 
way that clearly distinguishes it from 
nationalism. 
																																								 																				
3 For clarity of argument I start with the 
conceptual distinction between nationalism and 
populism, but this distinction is actually the 
result of an iterative process that included theory 
and the empirical analysis of VB rhetoric about 
culture. 
 
Nationalism is a discourse structured 
around the nodal point4 nation, 
envisaged as a limited and sovereign 
community that exists through time and 
is tied to a certain space, and that is 
constructed through an in/out 
(member/non-member), opposition 
between the nation and its outgroups.  
 
Nationalism is a discourse that 
constructs the nation (see Bhabha 1990; 
Day and Thompson 2004: 13-17; Jenkins 
and Sofos 1996: 11; Sutherland 2005: 
186). This approach moves away from 
the more traditional search for the 
essence of the nation (what defines 
national belonging?), towards the 
identification of the particularities of the 
discursive construction of the nation by 
nationalism. 
 
The starting point for a definition of 
nationalism as a discourse is the signifier 
the nation (e.g. Freeden 1998; Sutherland 
2005). The centrality of ‘the nation’ does 
not mean that nationalists necessarily 
(exclusively), use the word ‘nation’ to 
refer to the national group. Nationalists 
also often refer to ‘the people’ (das Volk, 
el pueblo), for example.5 What matters is 
that nationalist politics are structured 
around the claim to represent a group 
constructed in a particular nationalist 
way. The nation is the ‘organising 
																																								 																				
4 Nodal points are the ‘privileged discursive 
points that partially fix meaning within signifying 
chains’ (Torfing 1999: 98), and around which 
other signifiers within the discourse acquire their 
meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 112). 
5 Although the terms nation and people are not 
neatly connected to different traditions of 
nationalist thought, and both have an ethnic-
cultural and civic meaning, nation and people 
have come to acquire a more political and a 
more ethnic-cultural meaning respectively (Rémi-
Giraud 1996). 
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principle’ (Greenfeld 1992: 7), that makes 
all different nationalisms nationalist; or in 
discourse-theoretical terms, the nodal 
point around which nationalist discourse 
is structured (see Sutherland 2005: 186). 
In nationalist discourse, other signifiers – 
the presence of which is not a necessary 
for a discourse to be nationalist – such 
as for example state, land, freedom, and 
democracy acquire meaning in relation 
to the signifier nation (see Freeden 1998: 
755). 
 
Nationalism is structured around an 
in/out relation (Dyrberg 2003), with the 
‘in’ consisting of the members of the 
nation and the ‘out’ of different types of 
non-members. As the in/out 
construction of group identity is not 
exclusive to nationalism, we need to 
identify the particular manner in which 
nationalism constructs ‘in’ and ‘out’ (see 
Day and Thompson 2004: 102-103). Here 
we can turn to Anderson’s (2006), idea of 
the nation as a ‘imagined community’. 
Although Anderson was concerned ‘in an 
anthropological spirit’ (2006: 6), with how 
the members of a nation imagine 
themselves as a community, his analysis 
is very helpful to understand how the 
nation is discursively constructed 
through nationalist discourse. 
 
Firstly, the nation is constructed as 
limited: nationalism is first and foremost 
a representation of the world as made 
up of distinct nations (Anderson 2006: 7). 
Indeed, ‘the nation’ can only be 
constructed through the distinction 
between one nation and other nations, 
and between members of the nation and 
non-members. Secondly, the nation is 
constructed as a community. Whereas to 
Anderson, community means that the 
members of the nation actually feel as if 
they belong together, what matters from 
a discursive perspective is the discursive 
construction of the nation as an organic 
community that all members of the 
nation are considered to be part of. 
Thirdly, the nation is constructed as 
sovereign: it has the rights to take 
decisions independently and without 
interference. This becomes most evident 
in demands for an independent state or 
sub-state. In nationalism the state’s 
legitimacy depends on its representation 
of the sovereign nation (see Jenkins and 
Sofos 1996). Shared time (a shared past, 
present, and future), and space (a shared 
territory with borders and certain 
characteristics), – and the shared 
language, customs, etc. that follow from 
this – serve to differentiate ingroup from 
outgroup, to obscure the (historical), 
contingency of the nation, and to provide 
legitimacy for the nation’s sovereignty 
over a territory (Freeden 1998: 752; 
Wodak et al. 2009: 26). 
 
 
Populism as a discourse 
 
As a populist party, the VB’s rhetoric 
about culture and its relations to artists 
are also characterised by a strong 
populist dimension. Populism is a 
discourse structured around the nodal 
points ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, in 
which the meaning of ‘the people’ and 
‘the elite’ is constructed through a 
down/up antagonism between ‘the 
people’ as a large powerless group and 
‘the elite’ as a small and illegitimately 
powerful group. Populists claim to 
represent ‘the people’ against a (some), 
illegitimate ‘elite’, and construct their 
political demands as representing the 
will of ‘the people’ (see Laclau 2005a, 
2005b; Stavrakakis 2004; Stavrakakis 
and Katsambekis 2014). 
 
The definition proposed here focuses on 
how populism interpellates and 
mobilises subjects and how it formulates 
its demands. By looking at populism in 
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this way, our understanding of populism 
is formalised: the focus moves away from 
the precise contents of populism, to how 
it formulates ‘those contents – whatever 
those contents are’ (Laclau 2005b: 33). 
Populism revolves around the 
antagonistic relation between ‘the 
people’ and ‘the elite’. Populists bring 
together different demands and 
identities in what Laclau and Mouffe 
(2001), call a ‘chain of equivalence’ that 
is symbolised by the signifier ‘the people’. 
What groups different demands and 
identities together in such a chain – 
what makes them equivalent – is not 
something positive they have in 
common, but that they are all frustrated 
and endangered by the elite (see Laclau 
2005a, 2005b; Stavrakakis and 
Katsambekis 2014). Across the wide 
diversity of populist politics, populists 
mobilise and simultaneously stimulate or 
reinforce dissatisfaction with ‘the elite’ 
for its (real and/or perceived), frustrating 
or endangering of a number of demands, 
interests or identities (see Stanley 2008: 
98). Who is part of this illegitimate elite 
and why depends on the political 
programme of the populist political actor 
in question. ‘The elite’ is a flexible notion 
that has usually included national and 
international politicians, parties and 
institutions, but also business people, 
judges, academics, intellectuals, and – 
most relevant to our purposes in this 
article – artists and media professionals. 
 
Through its focus on how populism 
discursively constructs ‘the people’ in 
opposition to ‘the elite’, this definition 
goes against the tendency to take for 
granted (to a more or lesser extent), the 
existence of the category ‘the people’ in 
definitions of populism as a style of 
political communication or performance 
that speaks about ‘the people’ and/or 
appeals to ‘the people’ (e.g. Jagers and 
Walgrave 2007; Kazin 1995). It also 
highlights more explicitly the 
construction of ‘the people’ than 
conceptualisations of populism as a set 
of ideas (a (thin), ideology), about what 
the role of the people and the elite in 
politics should be (e.g. Canovan 2008; 
Mudde 2007; Stanley 2008). By moving 
away from the notion of ideology to a 
focus on how populists discursively 
construct and claim to represent ‘the 
people’, a discourse-theoretical 
conceptualization also takes into 
account more thoroughly the crucial 
strategic dimensions of populism. Parties 
and movements can turn to populism as 
a strategy to acquire power, even when 
they were originally not populist. And 
they do not necessarily remain populist 
once they are in power. Finally, populism 
is not necessarily opposed to the 
existence of the elite per se, but against 
a current and illegitimate elite. Indeed, 
populists strive to replace this elite as 
power holders using the claim that they 
would represent the people-as-
underdog. 
 
In spatial terms, populism is structured 
around a vertical, down/up axis that 
refers to power, status and hierarchical 
position (Dyrberg 2003; Laclau 1977). 
Populist rhetoric often refers to these 
down/up identities with the words ‘the 
people’ and ‘the elite’ but also uses a 
range of other labels. What is crucial is 
that populists claim to speak for ‘the 
ordinary people’, ‘the little man’, ‘the 
common man’, ‘the man in the street’ as 
a down-group, and reject ‘the 
establishment’, ‘the political caste’, ‘the 
ruling’ as an up-group for not 
representing ‘the people’ and for 
endangering its interests. 
 
This spatial perspective makes the 
conceptual distinction between 
nationalism and populism more tangible. 
Nationalism is a claim to represent the 
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nation, envisaged as a limited 
community and constructed through the 
in/out distinction between the nation 
(that can also be called people), and its 
outgroups. Populism is a claim to 
represent the people as a large and 
powerless group discursively constructed 
through the down/up opposition 
between the people and an illegitimate 
elite. 
 
 
Populism, nationalism and the VB as a 
populist radical right party 
 
Before turning to the VB’s rhetoric about 
culture, let me say a few words about 
nationalism and populism in VB politics 
in general. The VB is one of the prime 
and core members of the populist 
radical right ‘party family’, alongside 
parties such as the Austrian Freiheitliche 
Partei Österreichs and the French Front 
National. Following Mudde, I speak of 
populist radical right parties to make 
clear that we are dealing with a 
historically specific manifestation of an 
older and more encompassing radical 
right tradition (Mudde 2007: 24; Mény 
and Surel 2000: 12). Indeed, some of the 
radical right parties that are populist 
today (including the VB), started out as 
explicitly elitist parties (and retain some 
of that quality). Radical right politics are 
characterised by exclusionary 
nationalism (Betz and Johnson 2004; 
Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007), 
authoritarianism (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 
2007), and conservatism (Betz and 
Johnson 2004). From the 1980s, many 
radical right parties increasingly turned 
to a populist strategy (Rydgren 2005).  
 
Nationalism – in its radical, ethnic and 
exclusionary variant, sometimes called 
‘nativism’ (Mudde 2007), or ‘ethno-
nationalism (Rydgren 2007), – is the core 
of radical right ideology. This certainly 
holds true for the VB, which is one of the 
heirs of the radical right wing of a long 
Flemish nationalist tradition and remains 
first and foremost a nationalist party. The 
VB originated as a cartel for the 1978 
elections of two radical right Flemish 
nationalist splinter parties that broke 
away from the Volksunie (People’s Union), 
and became a party in its own right in 
1979. Some degree of nationalism is 
present in most Flemish political parties, 
including those that are not considered 
‘nationalist’. Compared to other parties, 
however, the VB uses a more closed and 
ethnic definition of the Flemish people –
– as an ethnic nationalist party the VB 
uses the term ‘volk’ (‘people’), rather than 
nation (see Rémi-Giraud and Rétat 1996). 
It also has more radical nationalist 
demands than other nationalist voices in 
Flanders. The VB discursively constructs 
a ‘Flemish people’ through opposition to 
two main outgroups: Francophone 
Belgians and people of immigrant 
descent, especially Muslims. Based on an 
ethnic-cultural definition of the Flemish 
people, it urges for an independent 
Flemish state and for a very strict 
immigration policy that is based on an 
outright rejection of ethnic-cultural 
diversity. 
 
The VB has not always been a populist 
party. The party’s criticism of the political 
party system was originally much closer 
to an elitist radical right criticism of 
parliamentary democracy (Mudde 2000: 
112-113). Moreover, the party saw and to 
some extent still sees itself as an 
‘ethnically committed vanguard’ 
(Swyngedouw and Ivaldi 2001: 6), that 
should lead the Flemish people to an 
independent Flemish state. In its original 
programme, the VB also stated to have 
as a goal ‘to build up a hierarchically 
structured community connected to 
nature and people’ (VB 1979). To the VB, 
‘the Flemish people’ is an ethnic group 
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with an essential identity that is 
insufficiently aware of its own identity 
and needs to be made conscious of its 
identity by a nationalist vanguard and 
elite in order to become a politically 
conscious actor, to become a nation. 
 
Starting in the mid-1980s and especially 
in the 1990s the explicitly elitist and 
anti-parliamentarian character of the 
party increasingly gave way to a populist 
strategy. The party increasingly defined 
its political opponents as an elite and 
started speaking of itself as ‘the party of 
the people’ (‘Partij van het volk’), and ‘the 
voice of the people’ (‘De stem van het 
volk’), (see Jagers and Walgrave 2007; 
Mudde 2000).  
 
The VB’s populism is not limited to 
criticism of its political opponents. The 
party also criticises academics, 
journalists, and artists as an illegitimate 
elite. By lumping all kinds of opponents 
together under the label the elite, the VB 
constructs an antagonism between itself 
as the representative of the people and 
all its political opponents (in whatever 
societal field they are situated), as an 
illegitimate elite. It is to the analysis of 
this populist rhetoric about artists and 
particularly to the way it combines 
nationalism and populism that I now 
turn.  
 
 
Empirical material 
 
The current analysis draws its empirical 
material mainly from three large case 
studies. Each case study focused on 
cultural performances that became the 
site for strong discursive struggle 
between the VB and other political 
actors. These included artists, but also 
other political parties, journalists and 
civil society organisations. For each case 
all relevant empirical material was 
collected for specific periods of major 
discursive struggle, and a less broad 
range of material was collected for a 
much broader period. The first case 
study focused on the Flemish National 
Songfest (with a focus on 1978-1978 and 
1991-1995), an annual nationalist mass 
singing event where the VB and other 
nationalist parties and organizations 
meet (see De Cleen 2015). The second 
case study looked at discussions about 
the subsidised Flemish theatres in 
Brussels, Antwerp, and Ghent (with a 
focus on 1998 and 2005-2006), (see De 
Cleen 2013). The third case study dealt 
with the 2006 ‘0110 concerts for 
tolerance, against racism, extremism, 
and gratuitous violence’ (with a focus on 
artists’ role in antiracist mobilisation in 
1991-1992 and in 2005-2006), (see De 
Cleen 2009; De Cleen and Carpentier 
2010). Beyond these three cases, the 
current analysis also draws on less in-
depth analyses of VB external 
communication and parliamentary and 
city council interventions. This amounts 
to a total of 3584 texts. Table 1 (below) 
indicates the total number of texts per 
case for the five main kinds of material 
that were used in the analysis.6  
 
 
Culture as national and nationalist  
 
Nationalism and populism play different 
roles in the VB’s rhetoric about culture 
and in the party’s relations with artists. In 
this first analytical section I briefly 
discuss how culture acquires meaning in 
the VB’s radical and exclusionary 
nationalism and how the party has been 
connected to the cultural practices and 
																																								 																				
6 For each case study, empirical material also 
included a large number of texts produced by 
the VB’s opponents, but as these opponents are 
less central to the present article these texts are 
not included in this table. 
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strategies of the Flemish nationalist 
subculture. This nationalist rhetoric 
about culture and these nationalist 
(sub)cultural strategies, I argue in a 
second section, have often had very little 
to do with populism and have even been 
opposed to the culture of the ordinary 
people. As the VB developed its populist 
strategy, however, its relation to culture 
also acquired a populist dimension. 
Usually, the party uses populism to 
legitimise its nationalist demands and to 
fend off critique of its exclusionary 
nationalism. Sections three to eight 
discuss the different facets of this 
intricate articulation between 
nationalism and populism. 
 
  
VB external 
communication 
(party magazine, 
brochures, 
website texts, 
books, press 
releases) 
 
Flemish 
parliament, 
national 
parliament and 
senate, and 
Antwerp, Ghent 
and Brussels 
city council 
debates, 
questions, and 
interpellations 
 
 
Mainstream 
newspaper 
and 
magazine 
articles  
 
Television 
programmes 
with VB 
interviewees 
 
Articles in 
the right-
wing 
Flemish 
nationalist 
weekly ‘t 
Pallieterke7 
 
Flemish 
National 
Songfest  
 
 
 
126 
 
 
10 
 
 
540 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
193 
 
Theatres 
 
 
33 
 
58 
 
399 
 
2 
 
12 
 
0110 
concerts 
 
 
93 
 
0 
 
570 
 
4 
 
10 
 
Non-case 
material  
 
 
325 
 
1209 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Total 
 
 
577 
 
1277 
 
1509 
 
6 
 
215 
Table 1 
 
																																								 																				
7 ‘t Pallieterke was founded in 1945 for a readership of Flemish nationalists that had been involved in the 
collaboration with Nazi Germany during WWII. Whilst independent of the VB and sometimes critical of the 
party, it has traditionally been close to the VB. 
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The VB being at its very heart a radical 
Flemish nationalist party, the party 
mainly sees culture in nationalist terms. 
To the VB, (expressive) culture is an 
expression of Flemish national identity – 
of Flemish culture in the sense of ‘a 
particular way of life, whether of a 
people, a period, a group, or humanity in 
general’ (Williams 1983: 90). And 
expressive culture is also a nationalist 
tool to strengthen and protect that 
identity against the culture of outgroups 
of the nation (see Leerssen 1999).  
 
This becomes visible, first of all, in the 
party’s views on cultural policy. As 
linguistic homogeneity is central to the 
VB’s Flemish nationalism (and Flemish 
nationalism in general), the VB’s 
interventions about culture have often 
been about promoting the Dutch-
speaking character of culture in Flanders 
and resisting culture in other languages. 
As a party for which the resistance 
against the bilingual Belgian state is 
central, the VB opposes the presence of 
the French language in the Flemish 
cultural field. Its resistance to French 
goes as far as opposing the subtitling of 
Flemish theatre productions or bilingual 
programme brochures for cultural 
institutions. The party has also resisted 
the dominance of Anglophone popular 
culture – for example when demanding 
quota for Dutch-spoken music and a 
focus on Dutch-spoken television 
programmes on the Flemish public 
broadcaster – but this resistance to 
English became less outspoken 
throughout the party’s development. The 
VB’s opposition to ethnic-cultural 
diversity also has a linguistic component 
– the party is opposed to culture in the 
languages of ethnic-cultural minorities – 
but there is a strong ethnic component 
to it as well. The party has opposed 
government subsidies for culture made 
by, for, or in collaboration with ethnic-
cultural minorities, even if this is in 
Dutch.  
 
The VB’s associations with artists have 
primarily been a matter of Flemish 
nationalism as well. In contrast to some 
other European radical right parties, the 
VB has relatively less sustained and clear 
ties to radical right youth subcultures 
such as skinheads. Of major importance, 
by contrast, is the much more traditional 
Flemish nationalist subculture (with a 
much older membership). As the heir of 
the radical right wing of the so-called 
Flemish Movement, the party remains 
connected to this network of Flemish 
nationalist extra-parliamentary organ-
isations and pressure groups. The 
Flemish Movement played a crucial role 
in the foundation of the VB in the late 
1970s as an ideological breeding ground 
and as the basis from which to draw 
political personnel, militants, and voters. 
The Flemish Movement became less 
important to the party as its electorate 
widened far beyond this nationalist core, 
its financial basis was secured through 
electoral successes8, and the Movement 
lost much of its political significance. 
Nevertheless, the Flemish Movement was 
and remains a central cultural reference 
point for the VB. The party values the role 
artists play and played in the history of 
Flemish nationalism. Its party magazine 
regularly pays homage to (mainly 
historical), Flemish nationalist 
composers, singers, and writers, and its 
parliamentarians and other elected 
politicians express their support for 
subsidies for Flemish nationalist culture 
and commemorations of Flemish 
nationalist artists. The party has also had 
a strong presence at the two large 
																																								 																				
8 In Belgium, political parties are mainly financed 
by the state on the basis of their number of 
seats. 
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annual Flemish Movement events (and a 
long list of smaller events): the Flemish 
National Songfest and the Yser 
Pilgrimage. The Songfest is an annual 
nationalist meeting structured around 
mass singing, dance and marching band 
performances, mass singing, and Flemish 
nationalist political speeches (see De 
Cleen 2015). Whilst less of a cultural 
event, the Yser Pilgrimage (an annual 
commemoration of the Flemish soldiers 
dead during WWI at the river Yser), also 
includes singing and marching.  
 
 
Nationalism against popular culture 
 
Nationalism and populism have often 
been closely connected in the VB’s 
rhetoric about culture, but we need to 
consider carefully what that means. 
Because nationalism is the ideological 
core of VB politics and populism is a 
matter of strategy, the VB’s populist 
rhetoric is almost always also nationalist. 
Its nationalist goals, however, have 
certainly not always been pursued 
through a populist strategy. The VB’s 
nationalist rhetoric about cultural policy 
has often been rooted exclusively in a 
nationalist claim to speak for the Flemish 
nation and has had very little to do with 
the populist strategy of speaking in the 
name of the ordinary people. There is a 
degree of populism in the way the VB 
and other Flemish nationalists have 
opposed Flemish culture to the 
dominant culture of the Francophone 
Belgian elite. The opposition between 
(the expressive cultures of), two ethnic-
culturally defined national peoples is 
articulated in those cases with a populist 
down/up antagonism. But most of the 
culture defended by the VB for its 
national and nationalist importance is far 
removed from the taste of the ‘ordinary 
people’. The party has also supported 
subsidies for high culture it considers 
Flemish. This has included the Flemish 
opera, Flemish literature and poetry, and 
other cultural forms that have little to do 
with popular culture. And it has opposed 
certain forms of popular culture. Like 
others connected to the Flemish 
Movement, the VB has attached 
importance to what it considers the 
cultural emancipation of the Flemish 
nation; not only by developing ‘Flemish’ 
culture and opposing Francophone and 
Anglophone culture, but also by 
promoting ‘good’ and ‘decent’ culture 
and opposing ‘vulgar’ popular culture. 
 
The VB’s involvement in the Flemish 
Movement and its (sub)cultural scene 
has been part and parcel of its 
nationalist vanguard strategy. The 
militant nationalist movement strategies 
that were crucial to the party’s 
foundation have always remained rather 
disconnected from the populist 
strategies it developed later. This also 
becomes visible on the level of culture. 
Only few of the artists involved in Flemish 
nationalist events can be considered 
popular, in the sense of appealing to the 
ordinary people. Folk culture is rather 
more prominent at these events and has 
more obvious ties to nationalist ideology. 
The typical ‘folk’ values of tradition, 
authenticity and community are central 
to understanding the political mass 
singing event that is the Flemish National 
Songfest (Redhead and Street 1989; 
Leerssen 1999: 49-54). The VB and other 
radical Flemish nationalists have also 
criticised the presence of popular artists 
and popular genres at Flemish 
Movement events with the argument that 
this would divert the movement from its 
militant nationalist role. For example, the 
VB rejected the Songfest’s attempts to 
open up to new audiences beyond the 
traditional Flemish Movement in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The VB saw the 
evolution towards a more contemporary 
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programme that went beyond the 
nationalist songs, marching and flag-
waving characteristic of the (radical), 
Flemish nationalist subculture as a move 
away from what it considers the 
‘vocation’ of a nationalist Songfest, as a 
leading article in the VB Magazine about 
the 1991 Songfest entitled ‘Flemish(?), 
National(?), Songfest(?)’9 exemplifies (see 
De Cleen 2015).10 
 
 
The populism of VB rhetoric about 
culture 
 
As populism became increasingly central 
to VB politics, its populist strategy did 
also extend to the field of culture. For the 
VB’s populist strategy regarding culture, 
we need to look beyond the party’s 
connections to the Flemish nationalist 
subculture. Studies on the radical right 
and culture have tended to focus on 
radical right subcultures that revolve 
around radical nationalism and are 
situated outside of the mainstream. If we 
turn our attention to the VB as a 
professionally run populist party, 
however, populist rhetoric about culture 
becomes crucial because it contributes 
to the party’s identity as the party of the 
people and to its electoral appeal.  
 
The ‘popular’ character of popular 
culture holds a political potential for 
populists. The multifaceted meaning of 
the ‘popular’ in ‘popular culture’ is 
																																								 																				
9 Van Hauthem, Joris. ‘Vlaams(?), Nationaal(?), 
Zangfeest(?)’. Vlaams Blok Magazine 15, 4 (April 
1991), 1. 
10 The VB was also at the heart of a long 
backstage and sometimes frontstage struggle 
between more moderate nationalists and 
separatists at the Yser Pilgrimage, and was the 
driving force behind the foundation of the Yser 
Vigil as an separatist and right-wing alternative to 
the Yser Pilgrimage in 2003. 
important here (see Storey 2003). The 
potential of popular culture for populist 
politics goes beyond the fact that 
politicians often associate themselves 
with artists (and other celebrities), that 
have a broad appeal in order to feed on 
their popularity. As Street (2000: 77), 
argues, which artists political actors link 
up with is connected to their political 
strategies and to the kind of people they 
claim to speak for. From this perspective 
the question whether political actors 
associate themselves with, say, an opera 
singer, a rock band, a rapper or a 
schlager singer becomes politically 
relevant, for these genres all have their 
audiences and connotations. For the 
same reasons, it becomes relevant what 
kind of artists a political actor criticises. 
For populists, associating themselves 
with popular culture – in the sense of 
the ‘low’ culture of the ordinary people, 
rather than merely culture that has a 
broad appeal – and opposing elite (high), 
culture can be a way to stress their 
proximity to ordinary people and 
distance themselves from the elite.  
 
The VB’s populism was never merely a 
matter of associating with popular 
culture and criticising elite culture per 
se. The distinction between popular and 
elite culture offers potential for populist 
politics, but there is nothing mechanical 
about the relation between populist 
parties and popular and high culture. We 
have already seen that the VB does not 
dismiss just any form of high culture (it is 
positive towards high culture it considers 
relevant to the Flemish nation), and that 
the party does not celebrate just any 
kind of popular culture (it has been quite 
critical of Anglophone popular culture). 
Populism is a political logic used by very 
different political parties to voice very 
different demands. Which popular artists 
they associate with or which artists they 
criticise as an illegitimate elite depends 
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on their political ideology. The populism 
of the VB’s rhetoric about culture can 
only be understood if we consider how it 
is mainly used to legitimise nationalist 
demands and to delegitimise opposition 
to the party and its radical and 
exclusionary nationalism. The remainder 
of this article will consider this interplay 
between nationalism and populism in 
more detail. 
 
 
The VB’s failure to forge ties with 
popular Flemish artists (and its 
populist explanation) 
 
The VB’s populist strategy with respect to 
culture has had a ‘positive’ and a 
‘negative’ dimension. The ‘positive’ 
strategy has consisted of forging ties with 
popular artists and linking up with 
popular genres of culture. As the party’s 
populism developed, the VB has in some 
cases presented itself as the defender of 
the cultural needs of ordinary people 
against an elitist cultural policy. The 
ordinary people whose cultural needs 
the VB has claimed to represent are 
exclusively Flemish ordinary people, and 
the popular culture the VB has defended 
has been a sub-category of national 
culture. For example, the party has 
demanded that more subsidies go to 
‘accessible’ Dutch-speaking theatre. 
Subsidised culture, the party has argued, 
should reflect the cultural preferences of 
the taxpayer (a concern the VB does not 
have when it comes to national(ist), 
culture). Defending the place of Flemish 
popular culture in cultural policy, 
however, has never been a central 
concern of the party. 
 
The VB has also invited Flemish popular 
artists to its party meetings, interviewed 
them in its party magazine, and has 
otherwise attempted to associate with 
them. But all this has only had limited 
success, and the VB’s connections to 
artists have largely remained restricted 
to the Flemish nationalist (sub)cultural 
scene discussed above. Nevertheless, a 
limited number of popular artists has 
publicly spoken out in favour of the VB or 
has performed at the party’s meetings. 
This has included a number of schlager 
singers. The Dutch-spoken character of 
the genre of schlager fits well with the 
VB’s nationalism. And schlager’s 
outspoken lowbrow image and its 
association with fairs, countryside 
festivities, and (older), lower class 
audiences (see Simon 2000: 89), fits well 
with its populist strategy.  
 
Several of the artists that performed at 
VB party meetings and were criticised for 
it denied that they actually supported the 
VB politically by claiming that they ‘would 
perform for any political party that paid 
them’ (and they usually did not speak out 
explicitly about any political issues). 
Apart from a more general reluctance on 
the part of artists to engage with party 
politics, it can safely be assumed that 
the societal criticism of the VB also goes 
some way in explaining the reluctance of 
artists to perform for the VB, let alone 
explicitly speak out in favour of the party. 
 
The case of De Strangers is telling here. 
On 22 November 1992 the Antwerp band 
performed at the party’s Nationalist 
Convention in Antwerp.11 To perform for 
the VB at a meeting celebrating the 
anniversary of its 1991 election victory in 
a context of broad and strongly 
mediatised resistance against the party, 
was quite a statement, and the VB 
stressed this: ‘The popular band does not 
																																								 																				
11 VB (1997), Vlaams Blok: 20 jaar rebel. [20 years 
a rebel] Brussel: Vlaams Blok, 103; N.N. 
‘Nationalistische conventie: groot succes’ 
[Nationalist convention: a big success]. VBM 16, 
12 (December 1992), 12.  
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take part in the boycott and witch hunt 
against the Vlaams Blok’.12 
 
De Strangers could be said to culturally 
represent ordinary people in Antwerp. 
The band was known for its songs with 
humorous and political lyrics in Antwerp 
dialect sung over the melodies of 
popular international hits.13 Amongst 
other songs, at the VB’s Nationalist 
Convention the band performed its 
version of the Flemish children’s song 
‘Jantje zag eens pruimen hangen’ (Little 
Jan once saw prunes hanging). In this 
song De Strangers sing a number of 
mock foreign language versions of the 
lyrics to the children’s song. One of the 
verses went like this: ‘We are not racist at 
all, because we think it is normal that we 
also perform it [the song] in our national 
third language’.14 This was followed by a 
																																								 																				
12 N.N. ‘Nationalistische conventie: groot succes’. 
Vlaams Blok Magazine 16, 12 (December 1992), 
12. 
13 Before its performance for the VB, the band 
had already repeatedly shown its sympathy for 
Flemish autonomy and had been critical of 
immigration The band recorded songs such as 
‘Egmont Disco’ (referring to the Egmont Treaty 
that was the cause for a radical right split from 
the Volksunie), and A Mr. Brel (a reaction against 
Jacques Brel’s ‘Les Flamingants’, a song critical of 
Flemish nationalism). De Strangers were also 
close to the Flemish Movement in their criticism 
of Western opposition to Apartheid South Africa 
(‘Zuid Afrika’). As immigration became a societal 
issue, De Strangers also released songs about 
the presence of Moroccan immigrant in the 
Antwerp district of Borgerhout (‘Borgeri -
Borgerhout –Borgerocco’), and about the ‘abuse’ 
of Belgian welfare by immigrants (‘Ziekekas’ 
(health insurance provider)), but also songs about 
the hardship of being a guest worker in Belgium 
(‘De gastarbeider’ (The guest worker)), and of 
growing up between two cultures (‘Ik ben de 
zoon van ne migrant’ (I am the son of a migrant). 
14 ‘Wij zèn hielemol gin rassisten, want we vinden 
het normoal da we’t het ook is brengen in ons 
nationale darde taal’ 
mock Arabic chant including ‘Achmal 
ach couscous Arab’. The band member 
singing this part impersonated an Arab 
with a white cloth over his head. As he 
starts singing the audience at the VB 
meeting bood, jeered and whistled.15  
 
The performance sparked considerable 
controversy. In a book published by the 
VB six years later, we can read that: 
 
After their performance, it turns out 
that De Strangers are not welcome 
anywhere anymore and their very 
successful records are not played on 
any radio station anymore. Speaking 
of taking the bread out of someone’s 
mouth.16 
 
The ‘media boycot’ against De Strangers 
became a point of reference for the VB 
to show the disrespect its political 
opponents of the media elite have for 
freedom of speech; to explain why so few 
artists associate themselves with the VB; 
and even to argue that many artists ‘feel 
obliged’ to speak out against the VB out 
of fear. In an open letter denouncing the 
participation of artists in the 0110 (1st of 
October), anti-VB concerts in 2006, VB 
MP Filip Dewinter stated that: 
 
Evidently I realise very well that the 
cordon sanitaire17 does not count 
only for the Vlaams Belang. Singers, 
artists, writers, journalists and even 
																																								 																				
15 See this part of the performane of De 
Strangers at the VB’s nationalist convention in 
1991 at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E2i4J73HoXs 
16 Vlaams Blok (1997), Vlaams Blok: 20 jaar rebel. 
Brussel: Vlaams Blok, 103. 
17 Literally hygienic barrier, an agreement 
between the other Flemish political parties to not 
enter into coalitions with the VB. 
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sportsmen are the victim of it as well. 
May I give the example of the popular 
Antwerp band De Strangers who 
many years ago dared to perform at 
a Vlaams Belang manifestation. For 
years, they were boycotted by the 
public broadcaster, by all sorts of 
radio stations and by some concert 
organisers. It is indeed easier to cry 
with the wolves in the forest and 
point the finger at the Vlaams Belang 
than to withstand the pressure of a 
small group of politically correct 
artists like Tom Barman, Sioen and 
Arno [the artists behind the 0110 
concerts] who have declared 
themselves the conscience of 
Flanders.18 
 
What we see here is how the party turns 
the failure of its ‘positive’ populist 
cultural strategy into an argument to 
support its ‘negative’ populist strategy. 
The fact that artists are unwilling to 
support the VB is only further proof of a 
small elite’s battle against the party of 
the people.  
 
 
Delegitimising artists’ anti-Flemish 
politics through populism 
 
The VB’s ‘negative’ populist criticism of 
artists as an elite has been more 
outspoken and rather more successful 
than its attempts to associate with 
popular artists. This has not only been 
one of the ways for the VB to identify 
itself as the ‘party of the people’, but has 
also been the central strategy to counter 
and delegitimise criticism from the part 
of artists and media celebrities. It has 
been a very effective way of undermining 
																																								 																				
18 Dewinter, Filip. ‘Dewinter schrijft open brief aan 
artiesten’ [Dewinter writes an open letter to 
artists]. 6 July 2006. Downloaded from 
filipdewinter.be. 
the criticism voiced by artists. And in that 
way it is a clear example of how the VB 
has used a populist strategy to turn 
strong criticism of the party to its 
advantage. 
 
The VB has aimed it populist criticism 
mainly at artists that went against the VB 
or its radical and exclusionary ideology. 
Nationalism has been at the heart of the 
VB’s frequently antagonistic relation with 
artists and cultural institutions. Whereas 
the VB values highly the Flemish 
nationalist artists that put their art to use 
in the struggle for an independent 
Flanders, it formulates vehement 
populist-nationalist criticisms of the 
Flemish artists that are critical of 
(radical), Flemish nationalism or refuse to 
play what the VB considers their national 
role – to express Flemish national 
identity and to use culture as a tool to 
strengthen that identity. 
 
Some of this populist-nationalist 
criticism has been aimed at artists’ 
defence of the Belgian state. For 
example, the VB lamented the ‘cultural 
elite’s’ support for ‘the regime’ at the 
2009 and 2010 Belgavox concerts ‘for 
more solidarity and dialogue in Belgium’ 
(organised in a context of increasing 
political tensions between Francophone 
and Dutch-speaking political parties). The 
party’s articulation of nationalism and 
populism has been even stronger in its 
opposition to artists’ support for ethnic-
cultural diversity and their rejection of 
the VB’s racism – which has also 
structured broader societal resistance to 
the VB (see Blommaert and Verschueren 
1994; Detant 2005, Van Aelst 2000). For 
example, the 2006 0110 concerts ‘for 
tolerance’ one week before the 
municipal elections were dismissed as 
an elitist attack on the party of the 
people. The VB has also opposed all 
kinds of culture that it considers 
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multiculturalist, even when this did not 
go against the VB explicitly. This kind of 
critique has prominently been aimed at 
the Flemish theatres. The three largest 
subsidised Flemish theatres (in Brussels, 
Antwerp and Ghent), have produced 
quite some plays reflecting on ethnic-
cultural diversity and/or made by people 
with a migration background. The VB has 
particularly targeted the Koninklijke 
Vlaamse Schouwburg (Royal Flemish 
Theatre), in multilingual Brussels, for how 
it positioned itself as a Flemish theatre 
that is open to the entire city and its 
diverse populations. In this critique the 
VB combined its anti-Belgian resistance 
against openness towards French-
speakers with its anti-multicultural 
rejection of openness towards people of 
foreign descent.  
 
 
Artists in support of the Belgian and 
multiculturalist regime 
 
A central element of the party’s populist 
strategy to delegitimize explicit artistic 
resistance to the VB is to present these 
as political propaganda tools used by the 
traditional political parties in their 
struggle against the VB. By describing 
them as nothing more than camouflaged 
election propaganda, the VB has fit the 
0110 concerts and other large-scale 
anti-VB mobilizations into the populist 
antagonism between the VB as the party 
of the people and the political elite. For 
example, in an open letter to the artists 
participating in the 0110 concerts, Filip 
Dewinter called the concerts ‘a covert 
political meeting’. He wrote that: 
 
It is well known that really all means 
are suited to halt the rise of the 
Vlaams Belang. To that end the 
traditional parties are preparing all 
weapons to attack our party. On 
October 1st, one week before the 
local elections, a number of Flemish 
artists are organizing a real concert 
against the Vlaams Belang in 
Antwerp, Ghent and Brussels.19 
 
The party continuously stresses the ties 
that exist between artists and ‘the 
regime’. It describes cultural institutions 
(and media), as instruments in the hands 
of the political elite. In some cases, the 
party refers to political representation on 
the boards of cultural institutions such 
as the Flemish city theatres, or to the 
more general dependence of cultural 
institutions on political parties for 
subsidies. But the VB’s populist criticism 
of artists as supporters of the political 
elite does not depend on such 
indications of direct political influence. In 
the VB’s populist rhetoric, any artist that 
speaks out against the VB is 
automatically supporting the regime. VB 
senator Gerolf Annemans reacted to a 
number of artistic initiatives against the 
VB (including theatre plays and the 0110 
concerts), in the run-up to the 2006 local 
elections in the following way:  
 
What more can I do than formulate 
the restrained complaint that the 
art world in Flanders one-sidedly 
and unanimously condemns the VB 
as heretic, with that in practice 
strengthening the cordon sanitaire20 
(that intellectual and democratic 
monstrosity), and de facto per 
definition and without nuance 
siding with the governing parties, so 
with the establishment. The Flemish 
art world is establishment. It 
																																								 																				
19 N.N. ‘Concerten voor “verdraagzaamheid“‘ 
[Concerts for ”tolerance”]. Actualiteit, downloaded 
from vlaamsbelang.be, 4 July 2006, emphasis 
added. 
20 See footnote 17. 
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marches out against the opposition 
and serves the powerful.21 
 
The logic is as follows: because the VB 
opposes the political elite made up of 
the traditional parties, anyone who 
criticises the VB supports the traditional 
parties and is therefore part of the elite 
as well. It makes all criticism of the VB 
from the part of artists suspicious. 
Moreover, the VB uses a populist strategy 
to delegitimize criticism of the VB as 
undemocratic. Through its populist 
identification as the party of the people 
the VB claims the signifier democracy 
(the party of the people is the 
democratic party par excellence), and 
labels opposition to the VB as 
undemocratic. 
 
 
A privileged elite against the party of 
the people 
 
The VB has also denounced artists 
themselves as an elite. Artists that are 
opposed to the VB or its nationalism, the 
VB argues, are elitist because they look 
down on the ordinary people and are 
paternalistic in their aims to educate 
ordinary people. To the kind of 
knowledge produced by intellectuals 
(journalists, academics, ‘high’ artists), and 
political elites, the VB opposes the 
‘common sense’ truths that can be found 
with ordinary people. Referring to the 
intellectual analyses of the VB’s electoral 
breakthrough in 1991, the VB spoke of:  
 
A near endless mob of intellectuals, 
sociologists, political scientists and 
others elevated above the people […] 
after 24 November felt the need to 
																																								 																				
21 Annemans, Gerolf, ‘Over kunst en politiek…’ 
[On arts and politics] In Vlaams Belang Magazine 
3, 12 (December 2006), 3. 
raise their un-asked-for voice and 
finger to give their know-it-all 
perspective on the political 
‘earthquake’.22 
 
In this fashion, the VB reduced the broad 
alliance against the VB in that period to a 
limited group of ‘radical leftists’ that, 
through their societal positions, have 
privileged access to media outlets. 
 
Is our country stuck with 90% idiots 
and 10% good Flemish people of the 
people [volksmensen]? I do not 
believe so… According to me we are 
99,9 % well-meaning Flemings […] 
The other 0,1% is a different matter 
all together. It would have been no 
problem of those 0,1% had jobs that 
have no influence whatsoever in our 
lives. The truth is that those 
individuals work for the newspaper, 
for radio and television, that they 
write big dossiers for politicians, that 
they are professors in de humanities, 
that they play Rock ‘n Roll... In short, 
they are people that live a public life 
and are offered a platform on every 
possible occasion to ventilate their 
old-fashioned nonsense. 23 
Moreover, it is artists’ (and others’), 
privileged societal positions that explain 
their stance towards multicultural society 
and to the Belgian state, and their 
resistance to the VB’s nationalism. The 
nationalist-populist claim that its anti-
migration stance represents ‘what 
ordinary people think’ has been 
absolutely crucial to VB politics. The 
																																								 																				
22 Stalmans, Jan [alias for Luk Dieudonné] 
‘Vaderlandertjes gevraagd’. [Little patriots needed] 
Vlaams Blok Magazine 16, 1 (January 1992), 
emphasis added. 
23 Staveaux, Rein. ‘Een dam tegen ‘t multikultureel 
gezwam’. [A dam against multicultural bullshit] 
Vlaams Blok Magazine 16, 4 (April 1992).  
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sociological differences between the 
ordinary people and the elites have been 
a central element of this argument. The 
VB has insisted that it is the ‘ordinary’ 
Flemish people that suffer the most from 
multicultural society. They are the ones 
that live in neighbourhoods that suffer 
from ‘foreigner crime’, the VB argues, that 
have seen mosques constructed in their 
streets, that have lost their jobs because 
they were taken by migrants. 
Simultaneously, the cultural elite’s 
privileged socio-economic status serves 
to explain why they are so far removed 
from ordinary people’s concerns and 
fears. For example, the VB has argued 
that the Flemish theatres’ pro-diversity 
stance as well as their resistance to the 
VB is due to the privileged societal 
position of theatre makers as well as 
theatre audiences. The theatres and their 
audiences, according to the VB, accept 
the dominance of French (and other 
languages), in Brussels and the 
multicultural reality in the city because 
of ‘a certain form of urban snobbism that 
has and creates an overly exaggerated 
idealistic image of city life’.24 They are a 
‘clique of snobs’, ‘people who do not 
have problems in Brussels and live in a 
protected cultural milieu’.25 The VB 
opposes this elite’s purported idealistic 
																																								 																				
24 Arckens, Erik. Interpellatie tot de heer Bert 
Anciaux, Vlaams Minister van Cultuur, Jeugd, 
Sport en Brussel, over het problematisch 
karakter van het gentrificatieproces in Brussel op 
sociaal-cultureel vlak [interpellationon the 
problematic character of the gentrification 
process in Brussels on a socio-cultural level] 
Handelingen Commissie voor Brussel en de 
Vlaamse Rand, 29 June 2006. 
25 Francis Van den Eynde cited in Hillaert, Wouter, 
‘”Ik zou eens Shakespeare willen zien door 
Shakespeare”. De theaterdrang van het Vlaams 
Belang’ [I would like to see Shakespeare by 
Shakespeare once. The theatre urge of the 
Vlaams Belang], Rekto:verso 19, July-August 2006. 
view on living in the city to the reality of 
living in a multicultural city for ordinary 
Flemings, for ‘the large majority’. The 
populist distinction between people and 
elite allows the VB to locate its radical 
nationalist truths in the ordinary 
(Flemish), people, and to dismiss the 
multicultural and intercultural views of 
the theatre and its audience as illusions 
of the privileged few. This protects the VB 
from the criticism voiced by the theatres 
and strengthens its identity as party of 
the people. 
 
The VB has aimed its populist arrows 
predominantly at theatre makers, 
alternative rock bands, literary writers, 
painters, and other artists associated 
with (high), art or alternative cultural 
genres. But more ‘popular’ artists have 
also been criticised in a populist manner. 
These popular artists’ position on the 
‘low’ end of the field of culture does 
make integration in populist rhetoric 
more difficult. Whilst populism is a 
political logic, the position of artists and 
genres in the cultural field remains 
crucial because the cultural low/high 
position determines how easily and 
obviously an artist or genre can be fit 
into the populist logic. It is much easier 
to dismiss an experimental filmmaker as 
far removed from the people than a soap 
actor; and it is far less obvious to 
denounce a schlager singer as a 
member of the elite than an opera 
singer. This became most clear in the 
2006 0110 concerts, when a broad 
range of artists performed against the VB 
and for tolerance. This also included 
mainstream pop bands and even 
schlager singers. These artists were 
considered the cultural representatives 
of the ordinary people the VB claims to 
represent, and it was assumed that 
among their fans there would be many 
(potential), VB voters. The party first 
attempted to distinguish between the 
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‘elitist’ alternative artists organising the 
concerts (Tom Barman of rock band 
dEUS, chanson singer Arno, and pop-
rock singer Sioen), and the popular 
artists that were ‘misled’ into performing 
against the VB. However, as this did not 
have the desired effect and popular 
artists did not withdraw, the VB went a 
step further. In an open letter to the 
popular artists participating in the 
concerts, Filip Dewinter stated that:  
 
I am convinced that you as a 
popular artist want to stand in 
between and with the people 
instead of going against the people. 
I therefore do not doubt your 
honest and good intentions and am 
convinced that you will draw 
appropriate conclusions from my 
writings.26 
 
When it turned out that these popular 
artists were not willing to reconsider 
their involvement in the 0110 concerts, 
the VB stressed the populist distinction 
between ordinary people and artists and 
celebrities. In a speech at a party 
meeting one day before the 0110 
concerts of 1 October 2006, Filip 
Dewinter attempted to reconfirm the 
VB’s status as party of the people: ‘The 
Vlaams Belang is the party of the 
Ordinary Flemings and not of the 
Famous Flemings [Bekende Vlamingen, 
Flemish celebrities] and we are proud of 
that’.27 However, the VB remained 
reluctant to call the popular artists 
performing at 0110 part of the elite, and 
																																								 																				
26 Dewinter, Filip. ‘Dewinter schrijft open brief aan 
artiesten’. 6 July 2006. Downloaded from 
filipdewinter.be  
27 Dewinter, Filip. ‘Toespraak op de “24 uur van 
het Vlaams Belang”’ [Speech at the 24 Hours of 
the Vlaams Belang]. 10 October 2006, 
downloaded from filipdewinter.be. 
ended up keeping relatively mum about 
the 0110 concerts. The strength of the 
discursive connection between certain 
popular artists and the signifier the 
people makes the VB more ambiguous 
and cautious in labelling these popular 
artists as an elite. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has aimed to shed light on 
the interplay between nationalism and 
populism in VB rhetoric about culture. 
The article has shown that nationalist 
and populist discourse play different 
roles in VB rhetoric about culture. 
Nationalism is the ideological core of 
much VB rhetoric about culture and has 
been at the heart of the often hostile 
relations between the VB and artists. 
Populism is a strategy the party uses to 
position itself as the party of the people, 
to legitimate its radical nationalist 
demands as representing the will of the 
people, and to delegitimise artists that 
go against the VB or its nationalist 
ideology as an illegitimate elite. The 
intricate articulation of populism and 
nationalism is absolutely crucial to 
understanding the VB’s politics and the 
party’s success. This articulation has 
allowed to VB to present its demands for 
for its Flemish independence and 
especially its rejection of multicultural 
society as representing the will of the 
people, and to delegitimise all kinds of 
criticism and opposition. 
 
The VB’s ‘positive’ populist strategies 
towards artists have only half worked. 
The party has only rarely managed to 
associate itself successfully with popular 
artists or popular cultural genres. Its 
‘negative’ populist strategy has been 
remarkably effective, however, as a 
reaction to the vehement, mainly anti-
racist, resistance from the part of artists 
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against the VB. It reduced artistic 
resistance to the VB and its ideology to 
support of the political elite. And it has 
presented artists themselves as an elite 
that is completely out of touch with the 
day-to-day concerns of ordinary people 
who suffer from multicultural society. The 
VB’s nationalist-populist rhetoric about 
expressive culture has thus contributed 
to the construction of the antagonism 
that is central to its politics: the anti-
Flemish and multiculturalist political, 
cultural, media, and intellectual elite 
versus the people and the radical and 
exclusionary Flemish nationalist VB as 
the party of the people. 
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